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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3). The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). This appeal is properly before the 
Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs articulation of the issues, but do assert that 
Statement D raises the same considerations as Statement C and, likewise, the issue is a 
question of fact that should be reviewed for clear error. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action from the Fourth District Court that was filed 
by Plaintiffs Glade Terry and Kairle Terry against Defendant C. William Bacon, an 
orthopedic surgeon, and his group, Central Utah Clinic, P.C. Plaintiffs claim that Dr. 
Bacon incorrectly performed L5-S1 surgery on Mr. Terry's back, resulting in right lower 
extremity paralysis and pain. (R. 1-8) Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Court, which was 
subsequently removed to an arbitration panel to a valid arbitration agreement. (R. 30) 
Plaintiffs original counsel, Jim McConkie of Parker and McConkie, worked up the case 
and engaged in discovery with Defendants' counsel. 
Beginning in October 2008, Mr. McConkie began to negotiate with Defendants' 
counsel regarding settlement of the case, culminating in an agreement in January 2009 to 
settle Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants for $15,000. (R. 66, 67-70) Defendants' 
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counsel secured the settlement check and conveyed it to Jim McConkie. (R. 69) 
Subsequently, Mr. McConkie indicated his client was having second thoughts regarding 
the settlement. (R. 69) Mr. McConkie subsequently withdrew his representation of 
Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs hired their present counsel, James Haskins of James Haskins and 
Associates to continue to pursue the litigation. (R. 50, 58) 
Defendants made a limited appearance at the trial court and filed a motion to 
enforce the settlement agreement. (R. 60-82) Following briefing and an evidentiary 
hearing, Judge McVey ruled that Plaintiff Glade Terry had authorized Mr. McConkie to 
enter into a settlement agreement, that Mr. McConkie entered into a valid settlement 
agreement with Defendants' counsel, that Mr. Terry's claims were subject to that 
agreement, and that Mrs. Terry's claims were derivative of Mr. Terry's claims and, 
accordingly, had ceased to exist. (R 180, 152) Plaintiff then filed the instant appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 7, 2005, Plaintiff Glade Terry presented to Central Utah Clinic for 
a urologic consult, and was presented with an "Arbitration Agreement" (hereinafter 
"Agreement") by Defendants' representative. (R. 12-13) Plaintiff signed the Agreement 
and, by so doing, agreed to waive his right to have his Claim decided by a judge or jury. 
(R.12) 
2. On October 17, 2005, Dr. Bacon performed a surgical procedure at the L5-
Sl levels of Plaintiff s spine. (R. 7) 
2 
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3. On or about September 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against 
Defendants alleging, among other things, medical negligence relating to their surgical and 
postoperative care of Plaintiff, Glade Terry. (R. 8) Defendants subsequently invoked the 
terms of the arbitration agreement, and the parties proceeded in arbitration. (R. 30, 33) 
4. In October 2008, Jim McConkie (original counsel for Plaintiffs' Glade and 
Kairle Terry) and R. Scott Williams (counsel for Dr. Bacon and Central Utah Clinic) 
began engaging in settlement negotiations in relation of the above-captioned matter. (R. 
72) 
5. On October 23, 2008, Mr. McConkie sent a letter to defense counsel 
encouraging settlement negotiations. (R. 66) 
6. In early January 2009, Mr. Williams and Mr. McConkie had a telephone 
conversation in which an agreeable settlement resolution was reached. Specifically, Mr. 
McConkie, on behalf of his clients, accepted $15,000 for the complete settlement and 
resolution of Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Bacon and Central Utah Clinic. Mr. 
McConkie assured Mr. Williams that upon receipt of the $15,000, his clients would sign 
and fully execute settlement documents dismissing with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' claims 
against Dr. Bacon and Central Utah Clinic. (R. 70) 
7. On January 9, 2009, in reliance on the above-described telephone 
conversation, Mr. Williams forwarded to Mr. McConkie a check for $15,000, along with 
a Release of All Claims, Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice and Order of Dismissal 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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with Prejudice. (R. 70, 64) The accompanying cover letter instructed Mr. McConkie and 
his clients to sign and return the settlement documents. (R. 64) 
8. Despite agreeing to do so, Plaintiffs have failed to sign and return the 
settlement documents. (R. 70) 
9. In April 2009, defense counsel became aware that the settlement check sent 
to Mr. McConkie back in January had not been presented for payment. (R. 69) 
10. Defense counsel contacted Mr. McConkie about the settlement check and 
status of settlement documents. Mr. McConkie explained that he was experiencing 
difficulty reaching his clients to finalize the settlement documents and thus, had not 
presented the check for payment. (R. 69) 
11. In May 2009, Mr. McConkie contacted Mr. Williams by telephone and 
explained that his clients no longer wanted to settle and were seeking a second opinion. 
Mr. McConkie assured Mr. Williams that his clients had indeed agreed to settle the case 
back in January and now simply changed their mind. Mr. McConkie advised Mr. 
Williams that he had explained to his clients the settlement agreement was binding. Mr. 
McConkie expressed his intention to withdraw as Plaintiffs' counsel and asked for further 
time to try and explain to his clients, and any new counsel they were consulting, the 
binding nature of the settlement agreement already reached and why the settlement was 
fair and reasonable in light of the facts of this particular matter. (R. 69) 
12. On May 7, 2009, Mr. McConkie withdrew as Plaintiffs' counsel. (R. 50) 
4 
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13. In July 2009, Mr. Williams had another telephone conversation with Mr. 
McConkie. During that conversation, Mr. McConkie explained that he had spoken with 
Plaintiffs again and that they had retained attorney, Jim Haskins to represent them. Mr. 
McConkie further advised that he had tried to reach Mr. Haskins to discuss the consent to 
settle given by Plaintiffs prior to engaging in settlement negotiations, but Mr. Haskins did 
not return his telephone messages. (R. 69) 
14. On July 28, 2009, Mr. Haskins filed a Notice of Appearance of Counsel on 
behalf of Plaintiffs. (R. 58) 
15. On August 18, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement with the trial court. (R. 63) 
16. On January 7, 2010, Plaintiffs original counsel filed a lien on this case for 
his fees and costs. (R. I l l ) Therein, Plaintiffs original counsel identified $8,335 then 
owing in costs. 
17. On March 1, 2010, the Court entertained oral argument on Defendants' 
Motion. At that hearing, the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing to consider 
Defendants'Motion. (R.117-116) 
18. On May 10, 2010, an evidentiary hearing was held to consider Defendants' 
Motion. (R. 180) The key witness at the hearing was Plaintiffs' original attorney, who 
testified that a settlement agreement had been reached by the parties. (R. 180 at 17-27, 
44-48). 
5 
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19. In conjunction with Mr. McConkie's testimony, the parties argued whether 
the attorney-client privilege barred Mr. McConkie from testifying, and the Court 
concluded that it did not because Plaintiff had put his representation at issue. (R. 4-17, 
53-54) 
20. Plaintiff and his wife also testified and offered that they did not give their 
consent to Mr. McConkie to settle their claims. (R. 180 at 29-42, 48-49) 
21. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing - in particular the testimony 
of Plaintiffs' original attorney- the Court found Plaintiff had authorized Mr. McConkie 
to settle on his behalf, that such a settlement had been effected, and ordered Plaintiff to 
comply with the settlement agreement and otherwise granted Defendants' Motion to 
enforce the settlement agreement. (R. 53-54) The Court signed the Order on June 22, 
2010. (R. 125) 
22. On October 21, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 156) 
Plaintiffs' appeal was eventually transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. 158) 
23. On April 11,2011, Plaintiffs' filed their Brief with the Court of Appeals. 
(See Appellant's Brief dated April 11, 2011, on file with the Court) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs appeal comprises three arguments: Plaintiff asserts that the attorney-
client privilege allows him to prevent his counsel from testifying that Plaintiff agreed to 
settle a litigation where that agreement was then communicated to and accepted by 
6 
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Defendants and subsequently repudiated by Plaintiff. Second, Plaintiff asks the Court to 
declare that all settlements in the arbitration context should be reduced to writing before 
they are effective and legally enforceable, thereby relieving him of the effect of his 
decision to settle his claims against Defendants. Finally, Plaintiff asserts his decision to 
settle "shocks the Court's conscience," should act to relieve him of his related contractual 
obligations, and should allow him to try and obtain a better outcome regarding his claims 
against Defendants. Defendants oppose all three arguments. 
Plaintiff may not argue both that his attorney was not authorized to settle this 
litigation on his behalf and that the attorney-client privilege precludes his counsel from 
disclosing the extent of Plaintiff s settlement authorization. Rather, Plaintiffs own 
actions and fundamental notions of fairness require that Plaintiff and his counsel disclose 
otherwise protected communications to the extent that they reflect on Plaintiffs claim 
that he did not authorize his counsel to settle the litigation. To hold otherwise would 
allow Plaintiff to impermissibly use the attorney-client privilege as both a "shield and a 
sword." 
The panel should not determine that all settlements occurring in arbitration or trial 
proceedings be reduced to writing before becoming effective. Plaintiff did not raise this 
argument before the trial court and it is therefore an inappropriate subject of appeal. 
Moreover, to require the parties to reduce all arbitration settlements to writing before they 
are judicially enforceable runs contrary to well-established caselaw providing that 
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freedom of contract and judicial economy allow for judicially enforceable oral settlement 
agreements in those contexts. While written settlement agreements are required by statute 
in the context of mediation, distinct policy considerations mandate that result in the 
mediation context that do not apply to arbitrations or other litigation circumstances. 
Finally, Plaintiffs claims that the terms of his settlement agreement were so 
disadvantageous that he should be relieved of those terms is anathema to principles 
undergirding parties' freedom to contract, offends notions of judicial economy, and 
would have far-reaching policy implications were such a result permitted for other parties 
going forward. Plaintiff, through his appointed counsel, agreed to a settlement with 
Defendants that constituted a legal offer and acceptance and was accompanied by valid 
consideration. Plaintiff should not now be allowed to unilaterally void that agreement 
merely because he has reconsidered and wishes to pursue the litigation further. 
For all of these reasons that are more fully set forth below, the trial court properly 
found that Plaintiff was subject to the settlement agreement Mr. McConkie agreed to on 
his behalf, and Plaintiffs various arguments as to why he should be relieved of that 
finding should be denied with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
L BY DISPUTING MR. MCCONKIE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO SETTLE 
ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF, PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE REGARDING THE EXTENT OF HIS 
AUTHORIZATION TO MR. MCCONKIE TO SETTLE PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS 
8 
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Plaintiff asserts that the attorney-client privilege allows him to prevent his former 
counsel, Mr. McConkie, from divulging whether Plaintiff authorized Mr. McConkie to 
settle his claims against Defendants. Plaintiff further asserts that only where one of the 
exceptions outlined in Utah Rule of Evidence 504(d) or where Plaintiff "affirmatively 
attacks" his former counsel's conduct should the Court permit Mr. McConkie to discuss 
the extent of the settlement authority granted to him by Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that he 
has not affirmatively attacked Mr. McConkie's representation, but rather Mr. McConkie 
has attacked Plaintiffs recollection of events in conjunction with Defendant's motion to 
enforce the settlement agreement. In such circumstances, Plaintiff argues he has not 
waived the attorney-client privilege and is able to prevent Mr. McConkie from testifying 
regarding his settlement authority. 
Plaintiffs reading of the caselaw and exceptions to the general principles of 
attorney-client privilege ignores the contours of well-established caselaw addressing these 
issues. Utah's articulation of the attorney-client privilege is found at Utah Rule of 
Evidence 504(b) and provides generally that a client has a privilege to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person - including counsel - from disclosing confidential 
communications made in conjunction with providing legal services to the client. 
However, the privilege is not absolute and may be waived by the client. Courts have 
generally found that a party impliedly waives his right to assert the privilege "by putting 
the lawyer's performance at issue during the course of litigation," Bittaker v. Woodford, 
9 
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331 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir. Cal. 2003) (citing Hunt v. Blackburn. 128 U.S. 464 (1888)), 
or "where the client asserts a claim or defense that places at issue the nature of the 
privileged material," Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence: Practice 
Under the Rules § 5.30, at 549 (2d ed. 1999).1 
This general rule is well-founded in that it prevents 
a party from using the privilege as both a shield and a sword. In practical terms, 
this means that parties in litigation may not abuse the privilege by asserting claims 
the opposing party cannot adequately dispute unless it has access to the privileged 
materials. . . . The court imposing the waiver does not order disclosure of the 
materials categorically; rather, the court directs the party holding the privilege to 
produce the privileged materials if it wishes to go forward with its claims 
implicating them. The court thus gives the holder of the privilege a choice: If you 
want to litigate this claim, then you must waive your privilege to the extent 
necessary to give your opponent a fair opportunity to defend against it. 
1
 See also In re Lott 424 F.3d 446, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The [attorney-client] 
privilege maybe implicitly waived by . . . raising issues regarding counsel's performance."); 
Beerv v. Thomson Consumer Electronics. Inc., 218 F.R.D. 599, 604 (S.D. Ohio 2003) 
(holding an attorney-client communication is placed at issue "when a party affirmatively uses 
privileged communications to defend against or attack the opposing party. . . . Waiver 
therefore stops a party from manipulating an essential component of our legal system - the 
attorney client privilege - so as to release information favorable to it and withhold anything 
else" (citations and quotations omitted); In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 
470 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (party "may waive the privilege if [it] makes factual assertions the truth 
of which can only be assessed by examination of the privileged communication"); United 
States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285,1292 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding communications are at issue 
when the party makes an assertion "that in fairness requires examination of protected 
communications"); Tasbv v. United States. 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974) ("When a 
client calls into public question the competence of his attorney, the privilege is waived."); 
Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(3) (stating "[n]o privilege exists under this rule . . . (3) [a]s to a 
communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the 
client to the lawyer." 
10 
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Bittaker, 331 F.3d_at 719-720.1 
Here, Plaintiff attempts to use the attorney-client privilege as a sword and a shield 
by preventing Defendants from establishing that Plaintiff authorized his counsel to enter 
into the settlement that is the subject of this litigation. Nor should Plaintiffs assertion 
that he has not affirmatively attacked Mr. McConkie's representation and thus has not 
waived the privilege hold any weight. After counsel for Defendants and Plaintiff entered 
into settlement of this matter for $15,000, Plaintiff repudiated the settlement by obtaining 
new counsel and refusing to sign settlement documents. This forced Defendants to file a 
motion to enforce the settlement agreement and related motion practice, a hearing on 
Defendants' motion, a second evidentiary hearing regarding Plaintiffs interaction with 
counsel, subsequent briefing on the status of Plaintiff s wife's asserted claims in light of 
the settlement agreement, and finally this appeal. 
In conjunction with this rearguard effort, Plaintiff has steadfastly maintained that 
Mr. McConkie's version of events is false. Plaintiff submitted his affidavit to the Court 
on September 4, 2009, and therein asserted that "I have never told anyone that I would 
accept $15,000 to settle my case and [defendants]" and "I have never agreed to settle my 
case for $15,000 nor would I ever settle for this amount." (R. 90-91) At the evidentiary 
Defendants acknowledge that this caselaw is generally in the context of claims made 
by the state against defendants relying on the "good faith" advice of their lawyers or in the 
context of legal malpractice suits. However, Defendants submit that the rationale and 
language of these two scenarios apply intuitively and with equal force to the instant facts, 
viz., where a plaintiff continues to pursue litigation by denying that his counsel had authority 
to previously settle the litigation and where counsel did in fact settle the litigation. 
11 
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hearing held on May 10, 2010, Mr. McConkie testified that on December 29, 2008 he 
explained the status of the case to Mr. Terry and that Mr. Terry gave him permission to 
settle the case for $15,000. (R. 180 at 20) Mr. Terry subsequently testified at the hearing 
and repudiated Mr. McConkie's version of events, stating consistent with his affidavit 
that he told Mr. McConkie that he could not settle in light of all of his injuries. (R. 180 at 
40-41) Plaintiff subsequently stated that he was dissatisfied with Mr. McConkie and the 
settlement discussions, and for that reason obtained new counsel. (R. 180 at 42) Mr. 
McConkie then reaffirmed his earlier testimony that he obtained informed permission 
from Plaintiff to settle the matter in December 2008. (R. 180 at 45-47) 
Semantics aside, Plaintiff has clearly placed his lawyer's conduct at issue in this 
matter. While Plaintiff has not yet filed a legal malpractice action against Mr. McConkie, 
Plaintiffs refusal to sign settlement documents, filing of an affidavit disputing Mr. 
McConkie's authorization to settle the claims, and evidentiary testimony that Mr. 
McConkie's testimony regarding settlement authorization is false clearly "raise issues 
regarding his counsel's performance." In re Lott 424 F.3d at 453. Moreover, Plaintiff is 
expressly "us[ing] privileged communications to defend against or attack the opposing 
party," Beery, 218 F.R.D. at 604, and "makes factual assertions the truth of which can 
only be assessed by examination of the privileged communication," In re Kidder Peabody, 
168 F.R.D. at 470. Given those circumstances, "fairness requires examination of 
protected communications." United States v. Bilzerian. 926 F.2d at 1292. 
12 
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II. PLAINTIFF'S ORAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT EXTEND TO ARBITRATIONS THE 
REQUIREMENT THAT SETTLEMENTS BE REDUCED TO WRITING 
Plaintiff next asks the Court to disregard well-established precedents by extending 
the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Reese v. Tingey. 177 P.3d 605 (Utah 2008) to 
provide that settlements in arbitrations must be reduced to writing before becoming 
legally binding. 
While Plaintiff alleged below that there was no meeting of the minds and no 
memorialization of the settlement reached between Mr. McConkie and Defendants' 
counsel, Plaintiff never argued that the agreement was invalid because it was oral and not 
written, and never argued for extending the holding in Reese or even mentioned the 
opinion. Accordingly, the Court should not consider this newly raised argument for the 
first time on appeal. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 70 P.3d 904, 
911 (Utah 2003) fquoting Treff v. Hinckley, 26 P.3d212, 215 n.4 (Utah 2001) for the 
proposition that "[w]e will not address any new arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal" and Ong Int'l fU.S.A.l Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) 
for the holding that "[w]ith limited exceptions, the practice of this court has been to 
decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal"). 
Should the Court reach the merits of the argument, trial courts can enforce oral 
settlement agreements so long as there is an enforceable contract, i.e., a valid "meeting of 
the minds." In Murray v. Utah. 737 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1987), defendant State of Utah 
made an oral settlement offer to decedent's estate in a wrongful death action, and 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaintiffs counsel spoke with defendant by phone and indicated plaintiff accepted the 
offer. Plaintiff later changed her mind and reneged on the settlement offer, and the Court 
held the oral agreement was nonetheless enforceable.3 The Murray Court noted that so 
long as the statute of frauds is not implicated, the Court enforced the "basic and long-
established principle of contract law that agreements are enforceable even though there is 
neither a written memorialization of that agreement nor the signature of the parties," and 
ruled that "the fact that plaintiffs had not yet signed a written agreement is of no legal 
consequence." Id, at 1000. The Court of Appeals subsequently held that this result 
obtains whether or not a party is directly involved so long as the party's attorney has been 
duly authorized to enter into a settlement.4 
Given Plaintiffs arguments, a closer look at Reese is warranted. Therein, plaintiff 
attempted to mediate a suit involving a defendant and a worker's compensation insurer 
with a subrogation interest. During mediation, plaintiff asserted he reached two separate 
Contrary to Plaintiffs argument, the fact that plaintiff acknowledged her earlier 
agreement and then attempted to back out does not modify or inform the Court's ultimate 
ruling in any meaningful way, and will not be addressed herein. 
4
 See also John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., 876 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah App. 1994) 
(holding that "[i]f a client authorizes the attorney to settle the matter and has expressed an 
intent to be bound by the attorney's acts, absent a statute of frauds issue, an oral or privately 
negotiated settlement agreement is as valid as a signed, written settlement agreement that has 
been entered on the minutes of the court"); Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 
866 P.2d 581,585 (Utah App. 1993) ("It is a basic and long-established principle of contract 
law that agreements are enforceable even though there is neither a written memorialization 
of that agreement nor the signatures of the parties, unless specifically required by the statute 
of frauds. Parties have no right to Welch on a settlement deal during that sometimes 
substantial period between when the deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be 
garnered on a stipulation."). 
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oral settlement agreements with both defendant and the insurer. When the mediator 
attempted to reduce the agreements to writing in a single document, the insurer 
representative balked at one of the terms and refused to sign. Plaintiff then sought to 
enforce the terms of the oral settlement agreement with insurer, and insurer refused to 
discuss the oral agreement, relying on the mediation statutes' language regarding non-
disclosure of settlement discussions. 
Against that backdrop, Reese is not focused on preventing the danger of 
"plaintiffs attorney testifying against them and on behalf of their opponents," as Plaintiff 
asserts (see Appellant's Brief at 25); rather, the Reese Court's entire focus is on 
preserving privacy in the mediation context through requiring that settlement agreements 
be reduced to writing. Several factors regarding mediation militate in favor of treating it 
differently than arbitration with respect to the requirement that mediated settlements be 
reduced to writing to become judicially enforceable. 
In contrast with arbitration and formal litigation proceedings, mediations are one-
off attempts to settle the parties' dispute and avoid further litigation; this process involves 
candidly discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' respective positions, 
sensitive interaction with a trusted intermediary, and hypothetical settlement values and 
obligations in an informal atmosphere. To facilitate these sensitive discussions and 
mediation's narrow time frame, the courts and legislature are particularly sensitive to 
encouraging open and informal exchange between mediation participants that is only 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
possible in a confidential environment.5 To that end, the legislature codified the 
mediating parties' privilege to enforce the confidentiality of mediation discussions 
regarding settlement.6 Moreover, the legislature mandated that mediated settlements be 
reduced to writing in order to be legally enforceable, with the purpose of making such 
agreements enforceable without having to resort to testimony to determine the substance 
of mediation discussions.7 No such requirements exist for settlements in the arbitration 
context.8 
Utah caselaw is clear in confirming that oral settlement agreements are acceptable 
outside of the mediation context; in fact, only settlement agreements reached in mediation 
or that implicate the statute of frauds are required to be reduced to writing in any other 
5
 See Reese, 177 P.3d at 680 ("This candid exchange of information and ideas can be 
achieved only when the parties are assured that their communications will be protected from 
post-mediation disclosure."). 
6
 See Utah Code Ann. 78B-10-104. 
7
 See Utah Code Ann. 78B-6-207(3)(a); Reese, 177 P.3d at 609 ("A rule permitting 
courts to enforce only written mediation agreements operates in tandem with the rules 
providing mediation confidentiality. The existence of an executed agreement provides a court 
with the means to use its power to enforce the terms of a written agreement or to determine 
whether the terms of the written agreement have been violated without requiring it to delve 
into the confidential process that led to the creation of the agreement."). 
8
 See Utah Code Ann.78B-6-206, 78B-11-101 et seq. In Appellant's Brief, Plaintiff 
asserts briefly that the arbitration scheme's requirement that "awards" be in writing and 
signed or otherwise authenticated is analogous to a reduced mediation settlement agreement, 
such that the legislative requirement that mediated settlements be in writing should extend 
to settlements in the arbitration context. That argument misrepresents the nature of an 
arbitration award. The award is an arbitration proceeding's fact-finder's verdict, and is 
intended to be a final and appealable determination by the arbitration panel. See Utah Code 
Ann. 78B-6-206. It therefore requires more formality in its creation and fmalization than 
would a settlement agreement, and the two are distinct and separate in form and function. 
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litigation context. Given that fact and the substantive differences and policy purposes 
between mediation settlement discussions and those in arbitration or formal litigation, 
Plaintiffs request that the court require without legislative direction that settlements in 
the arbitration context be reduced to writing to be enforceable is unfounded and should be 
denied by the Court. 
III. PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE RELIEVED FROM HIS CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS BECAUSE HE ENTERED INTO THE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING ITS CONSEQUENCES AND THERE IS NO 
EVIDENCE THAT THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT ARE 
INAPPROPRIATE OR OTHERWISE SHOCK THE CONSCIENCE 
The final two arguments in Appellant's brief assert both that there was no actual 
meeting of the minds regarding settlement and that the terms of the settlement Plaintiff 
agreed to are so disadvantageous that they should "shock the conscience" of the Court 
and allow Plaintiff to renew his claims against Defendants. Plaintiff offers as evidentiary 
support for each allegation the same assertion, i.e., he didn't make very much money on 
the settlement. 
A. The Parties Reached a Meeting of the Minds with Regard to the 
Settlement Agreement. 
"In order for parties to form a binding contract there must be a meeting of the 
minds on all the essential terms thereof. To constitute a meeting of the minds there must 
be a fair understanding between the parties which normally accompanies mutual consent 
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and the evidence must show with reasonable defmiteness that the minds of the parties met 
upon the same matter and agreed upon the terms of the contract." Steele v. Harrison, 552 
P.2d 957, 962 (Kan. 1976). That some party changes his or her mind about the settlement 
terms does not amount to allegations of fraud or bad faith. Woods v. Denver Dept. of 
Revenue. Treasury Div.. 45 F.3d 377, 378 (10th Cir. 1995) (?,0rdinarily, a party who 
knowingly and voluntarily authorizes the settlement of her claims cannot avoid the terms 
of the settlement simply because she changes her mind." (citation omitted)). "Whether 
the parties had a meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding contract is an issue of 
fact which we review for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." LP III LLC v. BBRD. LC. 221 P.3d 867, 871 (Utah App. 2009) (internal 
citation, quotation, and punctuation omitted). 
Plaintiffs' argument that there was no "meeting of the minds" is essentially a 
request that the Court of Appeals consider de novo factual determinations that were made 
by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing regarding the same, where the standard for 
this Court is to review for clear error only. Following a hearing where Plaintiff, 
Plaintiffs wife, and Mr. McConkie all testified under examination by counsel, the Court 
concluded that Mr. McConkie's testimony was credible that he communicated the terms 
of the settlement offer to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff consented to the settlement. The Court 
found Mr. McConkie's testimony was corroborated by his own recollection, notes, a 
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subsequent phone call to Defendants' counsel, and the contemporaneous remittance of a 
settlement check. (R. 180 at 54).9 The Court also considered whether Plaintiff was 
competent, in light of potential pain medication usage, to have consented, and determined 
that he was. (R. 180 at 55). Plaintiffs instant claim that there was no "meeting of the 
minds" asks the Court to invalidate these findings and substitute its own. 
The fact that Plaintiff would have only taken $6,000 after Mr. McConkie recouped 
his costs had he accepted and finalized the settlement offer in December 2008 (and 
substantially less at this point) can hardly be taken as proof that there was no meeting of 
the minds. Defendants contend that this was intended to be a settlement of a doubtful and 
disputed claim, such that they did not anticipate paying much more than a nuisance value 
to Plaintiff in exchange for his dropping the suit.10 While the trial court found 
corroborating evidence and circumstances indicating Mr. McConkie obtained Plaintiffs 
consent to settle as he said he did, various factors motivate parties to settle, and may have 
motivated Plaintiff in this case. As has been aptly articulated, 
[T]he function of the reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment for that of 
the parties to the decree. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a 
9
 And, by extension, the Court found Plaintiffs version of events incredible and 
uncorroborated. In his brief, Plaintiff asserts that because the trial court did not make a 
specific finding that any party was "disingenuous, lying, or acting in bad faith relating their 
sworn recollection concerning settlement discussions," it was clear error to conclude Plaintiff 
agreed to the settlement. Plaintiff provides no caselaw in support of this naked argument, 
and Defendants rely on the caselaw and fact findings cited above that supports the trial 
court's finding was appropriate and should not be overturned by the Court. 
0
 Plaintiff asserts that the "material allegations contained in the Complaint in this case 
stand undenied by the Defendants." This is an odd assertion, given the parties ultimately 
proceeded in arbitration such that no answer to Plaintiffs Complaint was required. 
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compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties 
each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with litigation. 
Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have 
purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as 
much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining 
power and skill to achieve. The trial court in approving a settlement need not 
inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor reach and resolve the merits 
of the claims or controversy. It is precisely the desire to avoid protracted 
examination of the parties' legal rights which underlies consent decrees. It is 
therefore inappropriate for the judge to measure the remedies in the decree as if 
they were fashioned after trial. Remedies which appear less than vigorous may 
well reflect an underlying weakness in the [party's] case, and for the district judge 
to assume that the allegations in the complaint have been formally made out is 
quite unwarranted. 
Northeast Iowa Citizens for Clean Water v. AgriProcessors, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 666, 
676-77 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (citations, quotations, and punctuation omitted). Given that 
Plaintiffs only support that there was no "meeting of the minds" consists of the fact he 
would have received only $6,000 after costs (and now substantially less these years later), 
Plaintiff has no valid argument that the trial court's determination that there was a 
meeting of the minds was "clear error" or "against the clear weight of the evidence." LP 
ULLLC,221P.3dat871. 
B. Plaintiffs Settlement Agreement Does Not "Shock the Conscience" 
Plaintiff also asserts that given the actual amount of money he would/will receive 
under the settlement when compared to the merits of his claims, the "concession of the case" 
by Mr. McConkie is an "outrageous injustice which ought to shock the conscience of the 
court, permit the decision below to be vacated, and allow the parties to pursue their remedies 
in mediation." (Appellant's Brief at 29). 
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As a threshold matter, Plaintiff raises the "shocks the conscience" argument for the 
first time on appeal and, accordingly, the Court should disregard the argument. See, e.g.. 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. Inc.. 70 P.3d 904,911 (Utah 2003) (quoting Treff 
v. Hinckley, 26 P.3d 212,215 n.4 (Utah 2001) for the proposition that "[w]e will not address 
any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal" and Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) for the holding that "[w]ith limited exceptions, 
the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time 
on appeal").11 
Should the Court proceed to determine the merits of this allegation, Plaintiffs 
assertions are unsupported by the law. Defendants argue that "The trial court in approving 
a settlement need not inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor reach and resolve 
the merits of the claims or controversy, but need only determine that the settlement is fair, 
adequate, reasonable and appropriate under the particular facts and that there has been valid 
consent by the concerned parties." Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 
1117, 1126 (D.C. 1983). After a compromise has been entered into in good faith, in an 
action to enforce the satisfaction, 
the merits of the original controversy cannot be called into question. The law favors 
the avoidance or settlement of litigation, and compromises in good faith for such 
purposes will be sustained as based upon a sufficient consideration, without regard 
to the merits of the controversy or the character or validity of the claims of the parties, 
Plaintiff did assert that the fact that Plaintiffs would not be receiving much in the 
way of settlement funds supported their assertion that there was no "meeting of the minds." 
(See R. 51-52). However, there was no discussion that the settlement result otherwise 
offended equity or otherwise shocked the conscience. 
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or even though a subsequent judicial decision may show the rights of the parties to 
have been different from what they at the time supposed. The real consideration 
which each party receives under such a compromise is, according to some authorities, 
not the sacrifice of the right, but the settlement of the dispute. 
UtahNat'l Bank v. Nelson, 3 8 Utah 169,194 (Utah 1910) (citations and quotations omitted); 
see also Sofco. LLC v. Nat'l Bank. No. 08-2366-JAR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78823, **8-9 
(D. Kan. Aug. 3, 2010) ("Nor will a court inquire into the merits of the underlying suit after 
a valid settlement agreement absent fraud or bad faith. That some party changes his or her 
mind about the settlement terms does not amount to allegations of fraud or bad faith."). 
Here, the trial court found Plaintiff had given his consent to settle to Mr. 
McConkie. (R. 180 at 54-55) Plaintiff was originally to receive $6,000, a not 
insubstantial sum and which would clear his costs with Mr. McConkie. On those facts -
and, again, given that Defendants viewed his claims as doubtful and disputed - there is 
nothing in Plaintiffs decision to settle that would "shock the conscience" of the Court. 
Nor does Plaintiffs cited caselaw help him or establish in any way the proposition that 
courts have not hesitated to invalidate parties' settlement agreements "where the disparity 
between the injuries suffered and the actual recovery for those injuries is outrageously 
less than would be necessary to make the plaintiff whole." (Appellant's Brief at 29).12 
See, e.g.. Young Candy & Tobacco Co. v. Montova. 372 P.2d 703, 707 (Ariz. 1962) 
(defendants tried to avoid jury award by arguing it was excessive; court denied, holding "The jury 
and the trial court are in a much better position than the appellate judges to measure and determine 
the damages that will compensate the plaintiff for his injuries. They have an opportunity of seeing 
him and to discern his manner of testifying, his intelligence and capacity, to note his physical 
condition and other living evidences bearing upon the issue, including the attending circumstances, 
the larger part of which the appellate court is deprived."); United Oklahoma Bank v. Moss, 793 P.2d 
1359, 1364 (Okla. 1990) (involved, inter alia, sheriffs sale of property on which fraudulent 
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CONCLUSION 
Under well-established precedents, Plaintiff waived the attorney-client privilege 
with regard to whether he gave his consent to his counsel to settle Plaintiffs' claims. The 
oral settlement agreement was likewise effective under the caselaw, and there is no basis 
for requiring that such agreements in the arbitration context be first reduced to writing 
before becoming judicially enforceable. Finally, there are no equitable exceptions that 
apply to relieve Plaintiff from the consequences of his decision to settle this litigation. 
Accordingly and based on the foregoing argument and authority, Defendants respectfully 
request this Court to deny Plaintiffs appeal and uphold Judge McVey's rulings below. 
mortgages were obtained and admission by all parties that the sale was irregular and without 
appropriate preparation such that the properties were underpriced); Four B. Corp. v. Food Barn 
Stores On re Food Barn Stores). 107F.3d558,564(8thCir. 1997) (denying claim by would-be buyer 
that judicial sale of debtor's assets should be nullified because it "shocked" the court's conscience); 
Advocat Inc. v. Sauer, 111 S.W.3d 346,356 (Ark. 2003) (reducingnon-economic damages awarded 
by a jury in a wrongful death case from $ 15m to $5m where three defendants were in actuality 
operating as a single entity); Am. Trim. L.L.C. v. Oracle Corp.. 383 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(upholding $3 million compensatory damages award and $10 million punitive damages award in a 
software fraud litigation after defendant unsuccessfully argued that these values "shocked the court' s 
conscience"). 
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